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NOTES
IMPLIED EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY TO BRING
SUIT TO ENFORCE THE RIGHTS OF
INSTITUTIONALIZED CITIZENS
Persons who are involuntarily committed to institutions are at a distinct
disadvantage in securing their constitutional rights. When such persons are
institutionalized because of mental disabilities, that disadvantage is com-
pounded. Although these citizens have committed no crime, society has de-
cided to deprive them of their liberty, ostensibly for their own benefit. This
dual handicap of confinement and disability reduces to a minimum any likeli-
hood that these individuals will be successful in asserting their constitutional
rights.
It can be argued that the society which has contributed to the handicap
should help to insure that these citizens' rights are enforced. This notion lies
at the heart of so-called "right to treatment" law.' By implementing the
fourteenth amendment's mandate of due process and equal protection, this
law has been instrumental in establishing national standards for the care and
treatment of institutionalized mentally ill and mentally retarded persons. Al-
though these standards have received increasing judicial and legislative recog-
nition, 2 they have not always been given practical effect. The adequacy of
1. The right to receive treatment has its roots in the fourteenth amendment's guar-
antee that an individual will not be denied liberty without due process of law. As held
by a unanimous Supreme Court in Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972): "At
the least, due process requires that the nature and duration of commitment bear some
reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual is committed." A consider-
able body of law is now developing around the idea of an analogous right to "protection
from harm" which has the potential for being even more encompassing than the "right
to treatment". See authority cited in note 5, infra.
2. See, e.g., Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971) (retaining juris-
diction), 344 F. Supp. 373 (1972) (outlining treatment standards), af'd sub nom. Wyatt
v. Aderholdt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1975). The major legislative recognition has
come from the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 6001-6081 (Supp. V 1975). Section 6010 provides in pertinent part:
(1) Persons with developmental disabilities have a right to appropriate treat-
ment, services, and habilitation for such disabilities.
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each state's institutional program, and sometimes the adequacy of each insti-
tution within a state, must be individually litigated.3  This process is
agonizingly slow, especially when viewed in the context of the seriously harm-
ful environments in which many citizens are kept.4
The requirement of case-by-case determination, together with the need
for extensive proof and carefully detailed relief5 inherent in these "omnibus"
right to treatment suits, raises a cogent question: who will bring such suits?
Assuming that the hospitalized mentally handicapped patient is unlikely to
sue on his own behalf, it is possible that a concerned friend or relative will
bring suit. This is unlikely, however, because these suits attack the multi-
faceted operations of entire institutions, and the cost of discovery is prohibi-
tive for most private plaintiffs.6
In an effort to redress such inequities, the United States, through the
Justice Department's Civil Rights Division, has become involved in much of
the present right to treatment litigation. Until recently, participation by the
United States in right to treatment suits was restricted to two levels. The
most common entry of the Government into the suit was by invitation to act
as amicus curiae. 7 Unlike the traditional amicus, whose activity is limited
to the submission of a brief, the United States has been permitted to conduct
(2) The treatment, services and habilitation for a person with developmental
disabilities should be designed to maximize the developmental potential of
the person and should be provided in the setting that is least restrictive
of the person's personal liberty.
3. See, e.g., New York State Ass'n for Retarded Citizens, Inc. v. Carey, 393 F. Supp.
75 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (exhaustively detailed relief applicable only to members of "Wil-
lowbrook class," those who were at one time residents of the Willowbrook Develop-
mental Center). An action recently filed on behalf of residents of another state institu-
tion alleges that these standards are not being applied statewide. New York State Ass'n
for Retarded Citizens, Inc. v. Carey, Civil No. 76-2860 (S.D.N.Y., filed Jun. 29, 1976).
4. Generally, several years elapse between the filing of the complaint and the final
order. During this time, the residents of the institution are subject to continual threats
of physical and psychological harm, which invariably cause regression (loss of skills)
and can result in actual injury and even death. See Addenda A&C to Memorandum of
the United States in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, United States v.
Solomon, Civil No. N-74-181 (D. Md. 1976).
5. See, for example, the Willowbrook consent order, New York State Ass'n for Re-
tarded Citizens, Inc. v. Carey, 393 F. Supp. 715 (E.D.N.Y. 1975), reprinted in 1
MENTAL DISABILITY L. RPTR. 58 (1976), which covers 23 separate categories of relief.
6. See Alexander v. Hall, 64 F.R.D. 152, 154, 158 (D.S.C. 1974) (United States
allowed to intervene in a mental health right to treatment case in which plaintiffs were
financially unable to proceed with discovery).
7. See, e.g., Davis v. Watkins, 384 F. Supp. 1196 (N.D. Ohio 1974); Jenkins v.
Cowley, 384 F. Supp. 441 (N.D. Tex. 1974); Evans v. Washington, Civil No. 76-0293
(D.D.C. order granting amicus status July 30, 1976, revised to intervenor status Jan. 28,
1977).
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itself as though it were a plaintiff, and has been designated a "litigating ami-
cus" or "amicus curiae with the rights of a party." Subsequently, the United
States began to petition the courts to enter as plaintiff-intervenor, which more
appropriately classified the role that was taken. 9
On February 21, 1974, the United States filed a complaint as party plain-
tiff in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland charging
the state's mental health executives with failure to provide minimally ade-
quate care and habilitation for the 2400 mentally retarded residents of
Rosewood State hospital. 10 After extensive discovery, the defendants moved
to dismiss the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state
a claim upon which relief could be granted.1" Following briefing and oral
argument, the district court, per Chief Judge Northrop, granted the motion
to dismiss on the ground that the federal executive did not have standing to
bring the action. 12
The judiciary's reluctance to recognize the United States' standing in such
suits stems from the fact that there is no specific congressional enactment
which authorizes the Government to sue in this particular situation. The
8. See, e.g., Order permitting the United States to participate as Amicus Curiae,
New York State Ass'n for Retarded Citizens, Inc. v. Carey, Civil No. 72-356/357
(E.D.N.Y., June 13, 1973).
9. NCARC v. North Carolina, Civil No. 3050 (E.D.N.C. Order granting interven-
tion Feb. 12, 1974); Alexander v. Hall, 64 F.R.D. 152 (D.S.C. 1974); Halderman v.
Pennhurst, Civil No. 74-1345 (E.D. Pa. Order granting intervention Jan. 17, 1975);
Stamus v. Leonhardt, 414 F. Supp. 439 (D. Iowa 1976); Horacek v. Exon, 357 F. Supp.
71 (D. Neb. 1973); Rone v. Fireman, Civil No. 75-35A (N.D. Ohio Order granting in-
tervention May 25, 1976).
10. Complaint of the United States, United States v. Solomon, Civil No. N-74-181
(D. Md., filed Feb. 21, 1974). The complaint alleged that Rosewood State Hospital not
only failed to carry out its mandate of providing treatment and habilitation, but that
it failed even to keep the residents free from harm. Specifically, Rosewood was charged
with failure to recruit sufficient numbers of qualified staff, failure to provide treatment
plans, failure to provide psychiatric and social services, failure to provide a humane en-
vironment, failure to teach behavioral and social skills, failure to provide sufficient living
and sleeping space, failure to maintain sanitary kitchen and laundry facilities, and failure
to allow relief from the seclusion of residents in locked rooms or cells for extended
periods of time.
11. See FED. R. Cv. P. 12(b)(1), 12(b)(6).
12. United States v. Solomon. 419 F. Supp. 358 (D. Md. 1976). The opinion also
referred to a lack of power in the executive branch to bring the suit. Id. at 361.
A recent commentator noted that in certain situations it is difficult to distinguish be-
tween standing (a proper party doctrine) and related, issue-oriented doctrines, such as
the existence of a claim upon which relief can be granted (cause of action). See
Broderick, The Warth Optional Standing Doctrine: Return to Judicial Supremacy?, 25
CATH. U.L. REV. 467, 469-71 (1976). This confusion has not bypassed the courts and
is evidenced in the Solomon case.
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United States brought these actions pursuant to the general statutory author-
ity of the Attorney General to appear in matters in which the Government
is interested," contending that the United States has an inherent interest in
upholding the provisions of the Constitution against abuses affecting large
numbers of its citizens.' 4
This note will examine the authorities supporting the United States' asser-
tion of a nonstatutory power to bring suit and will attempt to ascertain the
limitations of such power. Thus defined, the theory will then be applied to
the specific situation presented by United States v. Solomon,'" and some con-
clusions will be drawn both as to the applicability of the doctrine to this par-
ticular case and to its general viability.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN IMPLIED EXECUTIVE
RIGHT OF ACTION
To bring suit on a federal claim, a plaintiff must have a cause of action
legislated by Congress. Although not explicitly stated in the Constitution,
it has been thought that Congress' power to authorize litigation can be exer-
cised for the benefit of its co-equal executive branch. 16 Lack of enabling
legislation will foreclose a plaintiff's claim unless the court determines that
there is sufficient evidence to imply a right to sue even though it was not
specifically articulated by Congress. Evidence from which the inference
of a right of action can be drawn has been found both in the Constitution
and in federal statutes.
A. Debs and its Progeny
Early in this nation's history the Supreme Court found implicit in the Con-
stitution the right of the United States to bring suit in its courts to protect
its own interests. The first of these cases concerned the proprietary' 7 and
13. 28 U.S.C. § 518(b) (1970) provides:
When the Attorney General considers it in the interests of the United States,
he may personally conduct and argue any case in a court of the United States
in which the United States is interested, or he may direct the Solicitor General
or any officer of the Department of Justice to do so.
14. See Memorandum of the United States in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss at 10-17, United States v. Solomon, No. N-74-181 (D. Md. 1976).
15. 419 F. Supp. 358 (D. Md. 1976).
16. This power may be implied from article III, § 2, which grants the Supreme Court
jurisdiction over "[c]ontroversies to which the United States shall be a Party." See, e.g.,
United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 27 (1960).
17. See Cotton v. United States, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 229 (1850) (suit for trespass);
Dugan v. United States, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 172 (1818) (suit on a bill of exchange).
1977]
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pecuniary' interests of the United States, but the theory was soon expanded
to include the Government's obligation to protect the public, 19 a notion which
received its broadest philosophical explication in the 1895 case of In re
Debs.20 Facing a threatened boycott which would have prevented interstate
railroads from carrying mail out of Chicago, the Court found authority for
the United States to pursue injunctive relief, and it refused to ground such
authority solely on the well-established proprietary interest in the mails. 21
Since Congress had activated its commerce power by assuming jurisdiction
over interstate railroads, the Court found that the United States had a duty
to remove any obstructions to commerce.22  It dismissed the idea that
criminal punishment was the exclusive remedy and found submission to the
peaceful jurisdiction of the courts preferable to forcible removal of the ob-
struction.23
Acknowledging that the plaintiff United States had a property interest in
the mails, the Court preferred to recognize the broader interest of every gov-
ernment in applying to its own courts for aid in the exercise of its powers
and the discharge of its duties for the general welfare. 24 Although the Court
recognized the impropriety of allowing the United States to invoke its powers
for the benefit of isolated individuals, it reasoned that "whenever the wrongs
complained of are such as affect the public at large, and are in respect of
matters which by the constitution are intrusted to the care of the nation,"
the United States must not be excluded from the courts. 25
In speaking of "matters . . . intrusted to the care of the nation" the Court
appeared to be embracing a broad parens patriae26 philosophy; but Debs has
most often been invoked for the more limited principle that the United States
has the inherent authority to sue for removal of obstructions to interstate com-
18. See Kern River Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 147, 154-55 (1921) (suit to en-
force forfeiture of a right of way); United States v. San Jacinto Tin Co., 125 U.S. 273
(1888) (suit to set aside a fraudulently obtained land patent).
19. E.g., United States v. American Bell Tel. Co., 128 U.S. 315 (1888) (action to
rescind fraudulently procured invention patent),
20. 158 U.S. 564 (1895).
21. Id. at 584-86.
22. Id. at 581, 586.
23. Id. at 581-83.
24. Id. at 583-84.
25. Id. at 586.
26. Literally "father of his country", the term has come to define a quasi-sovereign
interest in which the state, as a representative of the public, has an interest apart from
that of the individuals affected. See, e.g., Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251,
257-60 (1972).
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merce.27  Wyandotte Transportation Co. v. United States28 culminated a
series of these actions in which various obstructions to the nation's waterways
were enjoined in suits brought by the United States. The Rivers and Harbors
Appropriation Act of 189929 governed these matters, but the thrust of the
Act was largely criminal, and it did not provide for injunctive relief. The
Court considered the Debs rationale in its decision to imply a right of action
for injunctive relief. Evaluating congressional intent, the Court concluded
that the remedies provided by the Act were not intended to be exclusive 0
and that an injunctive action by the United States was appropriate, since the
Government was a principal beneficiary of the Act.31 Rather than providing
an independent basis for allowing the United States to bring suit, the Debs
case influenced subsequent judicial willingness to imply a federal remedy.
In the early 1960's, several cases were brought on the theory that certain
types of discrimination violative of the fourteenth amendment could properly
be challenged by the United States as an unconstitutional burden on interstate
commerce.3 2 Attacked were the racially segregatory policies of southern air-
27. Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191, 201 (1967) (suit for re-
imbursements for costs of removal of vessel negligently sunk in navigable waterway);
United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482, 492 (1960) (suit to enjoin disposal
of industrial wastes in Calumet River); Sanitary Dist. Of Chicago v. United States, 266
U.S. 405, 426 (1925) (suit to enjoin agency of State of Illinois from continuing diver-
sions of water from Lake Michigan). In the absence of Supreme Court guidance, lower
courts have read Debs as authorizing the government to bring suit in matters tangentially
affecting national security or the exercise of military powers. See, e.g., United States
v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309, 1313 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972) (suit
to prohibit publishing of classified information by a former government employee in vio-
lation of a secrecy agreement); United States v. Arlington County, 326 F.2d 919 (4th
Cir. 1964) (suit to enjoin collection from serviceman of local property taxes in violation
of the policies of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Relief A, t); United States v. New York
Times Co., 328 F. Supp. 324, 327-28 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other grounds, 444 F.2d 544
(2d Cir.), rev'd, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (suit to enjoin publication of the Pentagon
Papers).
28. 389 U.S. 191 (1967).
29. 30 Stat. 1121, 1150-55 as amended, 33 U.S.C. §§ 401, 403-04, 406-409, 411-
415, 418, 502, 549, 686, 687 (1970).
30. The Court referred to language in a prior decision to the effect that "[o]ther-
wise we impute to Congress a futility inconsistent with the great design of this legisla-
tion." 389 U.S. at 200-01, quoting United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482,
492 (1960).
31. 389 U.S. at20l.
32. See United States v. City of Jackson, 318 F.2d 1 (5th Cir.), rehearing denied,
320 F.2d 870 (5th Cir. 1963) (per curiam); United States v. Original Knights of the
Ku Klux Klan, 250 F. Supp. 330 (E.D. La. 1965); United States v. City of Shreveport,
210 F. Supp. 36 (W.D. La. 1962); United States v. Lassiter, 203 F. Supp. 20 (W.D.
La. 1962); United States v. City of Montgomery, 201 F. Supp. 590 (M.D. Ala. 1962);
19771
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port, railway, and bus terminals, and the often violent tactics employed by
the Ku Klux Klan in furtherance of racial segregation. The decisions rested
on a broader interpretation of Debs than had previously been enunciated.
While Debs and its immediate successors had been factually limited to remov-
ing "obstructions" to interstate commerce, these cases dealt with the more
ephemeral "interferences with" or "burdens upon" such commerce. Al-
though all of the cases relied on Debs as a grant of authority for the Govern-
ment to bring suit, most of them also cited the Interstate Commerce Act33
and the nondiscriminatory provisions of the Federal Aviation Act,3 4 along
with provisions allowing the Attorney General, as agent of the Interstate Com-
merce Commission, to sue to enforce the Acts. 35 The difficulty in relying
on this statutory authority was that the United States had sued not only the
carriers, but also state and local government authorities. The statutes could
only imply a basis for the Government's action against the noncarrier defend-
ants, and Debs was used to bolster that implication.
Speaking for a three judge court in United States v. City of Jackson,36
Judge Wisdom found apparent statutory authority for the suit under the Inter-
state Commerce Act but felt that there was independent, nonstatutory stand-
ing under the commerce clause.37  The United States had alleged that the
city of Jackson, through its use of segregated waiting rooms in interstate car-
rier facilities, had engaged in a pattern of conduct which continually violated
the fourteenth amendment rights of many citizens. The fourteenth amend-
ment violations, however, were considered relevant to the standing issue only
insofar as they created a burden on interstate commerce.38 Although Judge
Wisdom surmised that "-[s]uch thinking may take us down the road to recog-
nition of government standing to sue under the Fourteenth Amendment or
under any clause of the Constitution,' '3 9 the issue before him was framed
under the commerce clause and he was content to rest his decision thereon. 40
United States v. U.S. Klans, Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Inc., 194 F. Supp. 897 (M.D.
Ala. 1961).
33. 49 U.S.C. § 16(12) (1970); 49 U.S.C. § 322(b) (1970).
34. 49 U.S.C. § 1374(b) (Supp. V 1975).
35. 49 U.S.C. § 43 (1970); 49 U.S.C. § 1487(b) (1970).
36. 318 F.2d 1 (5th Cir.), rehearing denied, 320 F.2d 870 (5th Cir. 1963) (per
curiam).
37. Id. at 17.
38. Id. at 11.
39. Id. at 14.
40. In denying the petition for rehearing of this matter, Judge Wisdom's co-panelists,
Judges Bootle and Ainsworth specially concurred, restricting their finding of standing
to the "ample statutory basis" and finding no need to reach the question of nonstatutory
authority. 320 F.2d at 871.
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Judge Wisdom's prediction did not hold true for the school desegregation
cases brought by the United States prior to the 1964 Civil Rights Act. 41 In
those actions it was claimed that federally subsidized community schools at-
tended by children of United States military personnel should be enjoined
under the fourteenth amendment and the School Facilities Construction Act 42
from enforcing a policy of racial segregation. The United States' argument
that the fourteenth amendment violations constituted a burden on the war
powers clause4" of the Constitution was rejected by the courts.
The decisions in United States v. Biloxi Municipal School District44 and
United States v. Madison County Board of Education4 5 reasoned that since
Congress had not granted the executive the authority to enjoin racial segrega-
tion in schools, the United States had no standing to sue because it was not
an individual and could not therefore invoke the fourteenth amendment. 46
On consolidated appeal, 47 the Fifth Circuit affirmed, but adopted the differ-
ent reasoning used by the district court in United States v. County School
Board,48 which was that Congress had not defined a uniform national policy
on the education of military dependents and had actually recognized that
state law, not the war powers clause, should be controlling. 49
Although the district and circuit courts unanimously rejected constitu-
tional grounds for such suits, the district court in County School Board
granted relief under the statute. The operative provision of the School Facili-
ties Construction Act was an assurance that the schools receiving contribu-
tions for the education of military dependents would provide their services,
according to state law, in the same manner in which they were provided to
other children in the school district. 50 Initially recognizing that federal grants
41. See United States v. County School Bd., 221 F. Supp. 93, 101-03 (E.D. Va. 1963)
(dictum); United States v. Biloxi Mun. School Dist., 219 F. Supp. 691, 693-94 (S.D.
Miss. 1963) and United States v. Madison County Bd. of Educ., 219 F. Supp. 60, 61
(N.D. Ala. 1963), both aft'd on other grounds, 326 F.2d 237 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
379 U.S. 929 (1964). Cf. Allen v. County School Bd., 28 F.R.D. 358 (E.D. Va. 1961)
(denying United States' motion to intervene as party plaintiff in a school desegregation
suit).
42. 20 U.S.C. § 631 et seq. (1970).
43. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
44. 219 F. Supp. 691 (S.D. Miss. 1963), aff'd on other grounds, 326 F.2d 127 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 929 (1964).
45. 219 F. Supp. 60 (N.D. Ala. 1963), alf'd on other grounds, 326 F.2d 237 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 929 (1964).
46. 219 F. Supp. at 694; 219 F. Supp. at 61.
47. United States v. Madison County Bd. of Educ., 326 F.2d 237 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 929 (1964).
48. 221 F. Supp. 93 (E.D. Va. 1963).
49. 326 F.2d at 242.
50. 20 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(F) (1970).
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authorized by Congress create binding contracts, the court then sought to in-
terpret the contractual assurance.5 ' It concluded that (in enacting the stat-
ute) Congress had intended state law to govern but that the state law had
changed as a result of the Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Board of
Education"2 which made state-imposed segregation illegal. The United
States therefore could sue to enforce the contractual adherence to state law.
The Fifth Circuit interpreted the same statute but reached the opposite
conclusion. 53 It defined congressional intent as those remarks made by legis-
lators at the time the statute was passed indicating a lack of intent to dis-
turb then existing practices of segregation.5 4  Furthermore, the court held
that the United States could not even sue to enforce the contract, finding that
the statutory remedy of withholding funds was intended to be complete. The
court made clear that if the remedy was inadequate, Congress must address
the problem and concluded that Congress' desire not to interfere with local
control of schools overrode its concern for active enforcement of the Act.55
To the extent that these cases reject the Debs parens patriae rationale, they
express the belief that there must be some congressional determination that
the matter is an appropriate one for national policy, so that federal action
will not infringe on the rights of local government. 56
Judge Wisdom's theory was revived in 1970 by the District Court for the
Southern District of New York. In United States v. Brand Jewelers, Inc.,5"
Judge Frankel held that the authority to remove large-scale burdens on inter-
state commerce and the authority to correct widespread deprivations of prop-
erty without due process of law were alternate grounds of authority, each suf-
ficient in itself, to support the United States' right to bring suit.58 Judge
Frankel took the step that Judge Wisdom forecast in City of Jackson and
did so in reliance on the concepts expressed in earlier opinions rather than
on the particular sets of facts they addressed. The case concerned a credi-
tor's massive use of the illegal practice of "sewer service"5 9 to obtain default
.judgments against low-income debtors and to satisfy the judgments through
garnishment of wages. Judge Frankel noted that the doctrinal bases for al-
51. 221 F. Supp. at 99.
52. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
53. Madison County Bd. of Educ., 326 F.2d at 239-42.
54. Id. at 241.
55. Id. at 242.
56. Id. at 242-43, citing United States v. County School Bd., 221 F. Supp. at 104.
57. 318 F. Supp. 1293 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
58. Id. at 1295.
59. The term refers to the fact that the ultimate recipient of the court authorized ser-
vice of process is not the individual to whom the process is addressed. See note 63,
infra.
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lowing the United States to pursue injunctive relief against large-scale viola-
tions of both the commerce clause and the fourteenth amendment were "sub-
stantially identical." 60 The Debs rationale, he asserted, was triggered by an
obstruction of broad impact, sufficient to be thought public rather than
private, threatening such injury as would bring into play the government's
"powers and duties to be exercised and discharged for the general welfare." 6'
Judge Frankel advocated a classic parens patriae theory, expressing an
undercurrent running through the Debs and City of Jackson opinions.
Responding to the defendants' concern that a recognition of fourteenth
amendment-based standing would unfairly pit the resources of the federal
government against a weaker party, Judge Frankel suggested that the action
ultimately would be subject to congressional control and that no remedy
would issue without careful judicial evaluation.6 2 The court's implication of
such a broad right of action may have been influenced by the particularly
egregious conduct of the defendants, which could have continued unchecked
had the suit been dismissed. 63
Statutory authority does exist for the commerce clause rationale in Brand
Jewelers. The Consumer Credit Protection Act 64 states that garnishment by
creditors constitutes a substantial burden on interstate commerce. No statu-
tory authority was cited to support the fourteenth amendment action, how-
ever, as the court did not even discuss the possible applications of either the
civil65 or criminal"6 civil rights statutes to the facts at hand. Brand Jewlers
stands as the high-water mark of judicial willingness to extend the Debs
rationale.
B. Standards For An Implied Action
The cases purporting to follow the Debs philosophy of implying inherelit
authority of the United States to bring suit range from almost pure constitu-
tional implication (Brand Jewlers) to implication from a very particularized
60. Brand Jewelers, 318 F. Supp. at 1295.
61. Id. at 1299, quoting Debs, 158 U.S. at 584.
62. 318 F. Supp. 1299.
63. Id. at 1294. Brand Jewelers' salesmen peddled goods door to door in ghetto
neighborhoods, securing business through easy credit, long term payment plans. They
filed thousands of complaints yearly in the courts alleging default on payments and ac-
companied by false affidavits of service of process (sewer service). When the un-
knowing defendant failed to appear in court, Brand Jewelers would obtain default judg-
ments which were satisfied through garnishment of wages. See 84 HARV. L. REv. 1930,
1938 (1971).
64. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1607 (1970).
65. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
66. 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1970).
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statute (Wyandotte). Since virtually all of these cases have used the prin-
ciples of implied rights of action and remedies, it is useful to ascertain just
what those principles are and how they have developed. First, it is pertinent
to note that although these standards have evolved largely in cases which did
not involve federal plaintiffs, 67 the presence of a federal plaintiff would not
substantially change the issues. There is one caveat, however, since some
additional matters, which will be considered later, exist in federal plaintiff
situations.
In Cort v. Ash,68 the Supreme Court attempted to summarize the standards
for implication by articulating four considerations which determine whether
a private remedy is implicit in a statute not expressly providing one.6 9 The
first of these factors, and the one most often cited in the implication cases,
is whether the plaintiff is of the class for whose benefit the statute was en-
acted . 0  The second consideration is one with least support in prior law:
whether there is any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, to
grant or deny the particular remedy. 71  This approach has been criticized be-
cause by definition in implication cases Congress has failed to consider the
matter, and therefore, has expressed no interest. 72  The third focus, which
is arguably the most important 73 and is amply supported by the case law,
considers statutory purpose and adequacy: whether implication is consistent
with the underlying scheme of the statute, and would aid the primary con-
gressional goal.7 4  Finally, the Court found it appropriate to consider
67. Brand Jewelers and Wyandotte are both examples of cases which did involve a
"federal plaintiff", i.e., the United States. Most of the authorities upon which these de-
cisions were based, however, involved only private plaintiffs.
68. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
69. 422 U.S. at 78. Although the specific situation addressed is one in which the
plaintiff sought damage relief, the court noted that the same considerations would be
applicable to a claim for injunctive relief. Id. at 78 n.9. The specific examples em-
ployed also indicate that the principles are applicable to a federal plaintiff and to con-
stitutional implication. See notes 76-77 and accompanying text infra.
70. Id. at 78. Accord, Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau
of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 392 (1971); Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389
U.S. 191, 201 (1967); J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1974); Texas & Pacific
Ry. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39 (1916).
71. Id. at 78. See National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Pas-
sengers, 414 U.S. 453, 458, 460 (1974).
72. See Comment, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1392 (1975); Cf. Wyandotte Transp. Co. v.
United States, 389 U.S. at 200; U.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. at 431-32.
73. See Comment, supra note 72, at 1422.
74. 422 U.S. at 78. Accord, Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. at
200; J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. at 433; Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Rigsby, 241
U.S. at 39.
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whether the cause of action was one traditionally relegated to state law, in
which case federal action would be inappropriate.75
Presumably, failure to meet any one of these criteria would be fatal to the
plaintiff's claim, with the possible exception that silent or inconclusive legis-
lative history should not alone defeat other positive evidence of implication.
By their terminology, these standards appear to be limited to statutory impli-
cation, but the Court's inclusion of Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents
of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics76 in its discussion indicates that the prin-
ciples are also applicable to constitutional implication. The same can be said
for the fact that although the cases have generally involved only private plain-
tiffs, the continued reliance on Wyandotte77 in this area is evidence that these
standards can be applied to imply a right of action in favor of the United
States.
One other significant factor which must be taken into account whenever
the Executive is plaintiff in an implied action is the constitutional concept
of balance of powers. Since it is generally Congress' realm to authorize
causes of action, the Executive must be careful not to usurp power that Con-
gress intended to retain. Likewise, it is also Congress' role to enact any laws
which are "necessary and proper" to effectuate the Constitution. 78 As the
Constitution is the supreme law of the land, a determination by Congress that
a law is necessary to enforce the Constitution predisposes the question of
whether that law impinges on an area of state regulation and thereby impli-
cates federalism.
The activities of Congress, therefore, are essential to the delineation of an
Executive right of action. If Congress legislates a specific cause of action
for the United States, there is no concern for balance of powers or federalism
when the United States acts pursuant to that cause of action. Theoretically,
if a cause of action in favor of the United States can properly be implied
from a federal statute, as to that cause of action concerns about federalism
and balance of powers are similarly vitiated. A more serious problem arises,
however, when the right of action asserted by the Executive has been implied
directly from the Constitution,79 or primarily from the Constitution with the
75. 422 U.S. at 78. CI., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal
Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971); J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
76. 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (private right of action for violation of fourth amendment
rights implied directly from the Constitution). See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. at 78-80.
77. See id. at 79-80.
78. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 18.
79. That is, from a constitutional clause which specifically grants the power to Con-
gress, rather than to the Executive.
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support of a very broad congressional enactment. In such an instance, Debs
implicates balance of powers concerns; if the defendant is a state rather than
a private party, federalism becomes an additional issue.
.These concerns have been specifically articulated in those cases which have
rejected the United States' assertion of a constitutionally based right of
action;"' they played a significant role in the decision in United States v.
Solomon. s'
II. United States v. Solomon: THE ROSEWOOD CASE
In Solomon, both constitutional and statutory grounds were advanced as
bases for the United States' suit, but neither was found sufficient by the court.
The court, per Judge Northrop, read Debs and its successors to stand for the
principle that, while control over commerce was commonly the province of
Congress,8 2 certain emergency situations exist in which only the Executive
can respond quickly enough to alleviate the threat. The court found that
any further expansion of the Debs principle "works a subtle reorganization
of the balance of power" because the Constitution provided that Congress
and not the Executive should oversee the development of interstate commerce
policy.8 3 Judge Northrop rejected Judge Frankel's assurance in Brand Jewel-
ers84 that the courts and the legislature could provide an adequate check to
any executive usurpation of power, citing the possibility of capitulation by
a weaker defendant and the heaviness of such a burden of response on the
"time consuming and quite arduous" legislative process.85
The court's strongest objection to a broad application of Debs was its im-
pact on the federal system. If such expansion were allowed, "no state policy
or program [would] be safe from the questioning eyes of those few lawyer-
bureaucrats who have the authority to devise government lawsuits."'86  The
same objections were found applicable to the assertion by the United States
of a fourteenth amendment-based right to sue.87 Such encroachment upon
federalism might be countenanced if there were no other adequate remedy
for fourteenth amendment rights, but the courts noted that there was a statu-
80. See note 43 and accompanying text supra.
81. 419 F. Supp. 358 (D. Md. 1976).
82. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
83. 419 F. Supp. at 366.
84. See notes 58-67 and accompanying text supra.
85. 419 F. Supp. at 366.
86. Id. The court indicates that it also disfavors "Congressional assaults on federal-
ism through the Commerce Clause." Id. at 366-67.
87. Id. at 368.
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tory provision by which the individuals themselves could and in some instan-
ces had brought suit. 88
Having thus dispensed with the United States' constitutional arguments for
its authority to sue, Judge Northrop proceeded to reject any basis for statu-
tory implication. Reading Debs as holding that nonstatutory authority ex-
tends only to situations in which Congress, having expressed no opinion, pre-
sumably wants the executive to sue, the court concluded that Congress had
indicated a desire not to grant executive power in this type of lawsuit.8 9 Sup-
port for this assertion was drawn from three sources. First, none of the many
enforcement schemes in civil rights legislation covers this situation, thus indi-
cating that Congress intended the Executive not to have such a remedy.
Second, most legislation specifically concerned with the rights of the mentally
retarded creates its own remedies. 90 Third, the legislative histories of the
1957, 1960, and 1964 Civil Rights Acts purportedly show that Congress con-
sidered and rejected a provision which would authorize such a suit.9 ' The
opinion concluded that since Congress apparently did not want the Executive
to have this power, a heavy burden was placed on the Executive to prove
that such a power is implicit in the Constitution. 92 This burden could only
be met by showing of a national emergency, which was not evidenced under
the present set of facts. Therefore, the United States had not justified its
standing and the action was dismissed.9 3
III. STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATION
A. The Criminal Statute: 18 U.S.C. § 242
Judge Northrop found no basis for statutory implication in Solomon. Had
88. Id. The court refered to several such suits which are currently pending in Mary-
land courts.
89. Id.
90. The Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §
6010 (Supp. V 1975), provides for a cutoff in federal funding to institutions which do
not meet its articulated standards.
91. See H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964); H.R. REP. No. 956, 86th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1960); 106 CONG. REc. 5151-82 (1960); H.R. REP. No. 291, 85th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1957); 103 CONG. REC. 12350-65 (1957).
92. 419 F. Supp. at 371.
93. Id. at 372. Solomon was the first of two suits which the United States initiated
as plaintiff. The second case, United States v. Mattson, Civil No. 74-138-BU (D. Mont.
Sept. 29, 1976), based on nearly identical facts, was dismissed by a federal district court
in Montana on the Authority of Solomon. Both cases have been appealed, United States
v. Solomon, 419 F. Supp. 358, appeal docketed, No. 76-2184 (4th Cir. Oct. 21, 1976);
United States v. Mattson, Civil No. 74-138-BU, appeal docketed, No. 76-3568 (9th Cir.
Dec. 3, 1976), and litigation initiated by the United States pursuant to a theory of non-
statutory governmental authority is in abeyance pending resolution of these issues.
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he systematically applied the Ash standards, he might not have been so em-
phatic in his conclusions. He mentioned in passing that the criminal statute
allowing the Attorney General to prosecute civil rights offenders94 did not
provide the remedy sought by the United States, but he did not further in-
vestigate whether the remedy could, in fact, be implied from that statute.9
Under the Ash criteria, it is arguable that the United States could properly
be considered the beneficiary of a federal criminal statute such as this.96 The
legislative history is silent on the matter of an injunctive remedy,9 7 authoriz-
ing neither a grant nor a denial of such relief. 98 A cause of action for viola-
tion of the Constitution is not one "traditionally relegated to state law."99
The only remaining question is whether implication is consistent with and
would effectuate the underlying scheme of the statute. The Fifth Circuit had
occasion to consider the purpose of this statute in In re Estelle,1°0 1 a lawsuit
alleging widespread and systematic deprivations of a prisoner's civil rights.
In Estelle the court found that the statute was aimed at redressing depriva-
tions of civil rights under color of state law, but that criminal penalties alone
would be inadequate to vindicate such pervasive activity. 10 1 It chose, there-
fore, to accord the United States the benefit of the "deeply rooted" common
law principle of "permitting civil relief where criminal sanctions are inade-
quate or ineffective."' 1 2 This rationale directly supports a finding of impli-
cation in Solomon.
94. 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1970).
95. 419 F. Supp. at 368.
96. The Court of Claims has found the government to be the beneficiary of another
of the federal criminal statutes, 18 U.S.C. § 201 (1970) (the bribery statute) which is
similarly worded. Continental Management, Inc. v. United States, 527 F.2d 613 (Ct.
Cl. 1975). This case, however, involved the repayment of funds to the Government,
and the court stressed the compensatory nature of the action. 527 F.2d at 620. Never-
theless, the operative language of the two statutes, and indeed of all the federal criminal
statutes, is virtually identical, in that they provide: "Whoever [engages in a particular
crime] shall be fined [amount] or imprisoned [length of time] or both." 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1-2510 (1970). The report of the House Committee on the Judiciary accompanying
the enactment of Title 18 into positive law includes a history of the criminal code which
indicates that the thrust of the code is aimed at redressing "crimes against the United
States." See H.R. REP. No. 304, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1947). Under this rationale,
the United States is the primary beneficiary of the federal criminal statutes.
97. See H.R. REP. No. 304, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947).
98. See note 74 and accompanying text supra.
99. See Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946) (federal remedies for federal rights);
Cf. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388 (1971).
100. 516 F.2d 480 (5th Cir. 1975).
101. Id. at 486.
102. Id. at 487, citing Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191
(1967); J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964); Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Rigsby,
241 U.S. 33 (1916).
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The Ash court had examined in detail the problem of implying a civil
remedy from a criminal statute and extracted from prior decisions the
maxim that the provision for a criminal penalty does not necessarily preclude
a civil action when there is a "statutory basis for inferring that a civil cause
of action of some sort lay in favor of someone."' 0 3 In Solomon, the resi-
dents of Rosewood State Hospital could have brought individual actions
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983;104 therefore, the Ash standards for implica-
tion appear to have been satisfied.
The serious difficulty with implication is raised in Judge Northrop's evalu-
ation of the legislative histories of the 1957, 1960, and 1964 Civil Rights Acts,
insofar as they address the consideration of a proposed "Title III," which
would have granted the Attorney General broad authority to bring suit to
enjoin civil rights violations. 105 Because of the linguistic and conceptual
overlap of the civil with the criminal statutes, an authoritative congressional
denial of a specific remedy in one might be an appropriate measure of the
legislative intent of the other. The question then becomes whether Congress
did specifically consider and reject such a remedy. The legislative histories
show that such a provision was considered in the early stages of these Acts,
but that it was not included in the final draft of any of the bills. 10 6 The
text of congressional discussion attending the consideration of "Title III" re-
flects the politically charged atmosphere of the early civil rights era and in-
dicates that the provision may have been eliminated as a compromise to fa-
cilitate the passage of other sections of the bill.10 However, the histories
are at best inconclusive and they should not alone suffice to undermine impli-
cation when all of the other relevant factors are satisfied.' 08
B. The Developmentally Disabled Assistance and
Bill of Rights Act
A statute which is more precisely directed to the alleged abuses in Solomon
is the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act. 100  As
103. 422 U.S. at 79-80, citing Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191
(1967); J.L Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964); Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Rigsby,
241 U.S. 33 (1916).
104. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) allows individuals to bring suit for injunctive or other
relief for violations of their civil rights.
105. 419 F. Supp. at 370-71.
106. See authorities cited at note 91 supra.
107. See Hearings Before the Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
88th Cong., 2st Sess., 1372-1446 (Jul. 9, 10 and Aug. 2, 1963); 106 CONG. REC. 5169
(1960); 103 CONG. REC. 12551 (1957).
108. See note 74 and accompanying text supra.
109. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6081 (Supp. V 1975).
1977]
Catholic University Law Review
its title indicates, this statute enumerates congressional findings respecting the
rights of persons with developmental disabilities, including the right to appro-
priate treatment in the setting that is least restrictive to personal liberties. 110
The purpose of the statute is to assure that institutions receiving federal
funding for the care of developmentally disabled persons comply with the
congressionally mandated level of their care and treatment."' Since the Act
focuses on both the proper expenditure of federal funds and the appropriate
level of treatment for developmentally disabled persons, its beneficiaries are
both the United States and those persons for whose care the funds are being
provided. The cause of action can be viewed in two ways. It can be seen as
an action to enforce those personal rights which the statute protects, but it
can also be seen as one to enforce the specific terms of a contract created
by a grant of federal funds. 1 2 In neither instance is it a matter within the
jurisdiction of state law.
Judge Northrop found that the specific remedy provided by the Act, a cut-
off in federal funding, was intended to be exclusive.' 13  He reasoned that
Congress would not have gone to such great lengths to devise a plan involv-
ing one executive agency (HEW) if it intended that another federal agency
(Justice) with less expertise in the problems of the mentally retarded become
involved in potentially conflicting enforcement.114 This argument overlooks
the Act's legislative history, which reveals that the Bill of Rights provision
was retained over the objection of HEW," 5 and that its purpose was to
recognize that developmentally disabled persons "have a right to receive ap-
propriate treatment for the conditions for which they are institutionalized, and
that this right should be protected and assured by the Congress and the
courts."" 6 In light of the statutory purpose evidenced in this legislative his-
tory, the court could have concluded that termination of funding by HEW
was not intended to be the exclusive remedy.
Judge Northrop also found that the statutory remedy was an adequate
"carrot and stick" method to accomplish Congress' goals and to achieve what
the Justice Department intended in bringing the suit." 7  This argument
110. See note 2 supra.
111. 42 U.S.C. § 6010 (Supp. V 1975).
112. See note 119 and accompanying text infra.
113. 419 F. Supp. at 370.
114. Id.
115. H.R. REP. No. 94-58, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 23, reprinted in [1975] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 919, 941.
116. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 94-473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 25, reprinted in [1975] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 919, 961.
117. 419 F. Supp. at 370.
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similarly overlooks a crucial factor: that while a cut-off of funding may be
an adequate means of preserving the integrity of federal expenditures, it does
little to insure the congressionally mandated level of treatment for institution-
alized persons. If Maryland fails to comply with the statutory standards, the
"stick" comes down on the head of the Rosewood resident. Other courts
recognized the anomaly of such reasoning and have held that the United
States may sue to enforce the terms of contracts created by federal grants. 118
The question of the adequacy of the statute was further resolved by the
court in its factual finding that there are alternative means to protect the
rights of institutionalized mentally retarded persons as evidenced by several
pending lawsuits brought on their behalf." 9 The court noted, however, that
none of those cases contained the breadth of allegations and claims for relief
that were present in Solomon.120  The question remains whether the existing
statutory causes of action and remedies are sufficient. If the United States
is virtually the only party with the financial resources to conduct this type
of litigation, then existing statutes may indeed be inadequate. Although
there are hundreds of such institutions in the United States, few of these
"omnibus" suits have been brought.' 2' The paucity of such suits might be
encouraging if one could believe that the institutions provided adequate care
and treatment, but investigation tends to lead to the opposite conclusion.
If, absent the participation of the United States, existing resources are
inadequate to protect the rights of institutionalized citizens, these arguments
must be considered under the Ash principle of aiding the congressional
goal. 122 Thus even if the court ultimately were to conclude that it could not
imply a right of action from the criminal civil rights statute, the Develop-
mentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act appears to satisfy the
standards for statutory implication.
118. See, e.g., United States v. Frazer, 297 F. Supp. 319, 322 (M.D. Ala. 1968); cf.
United States v. County School Bd., 221 F. Supp. 93 (E.D. Va. 1963).
119. 419 F. Supp. at 368.
120. Id., n.2.
121. The Association for Retarded Children, which was a plaintiff in the Willow-
brook case (New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Carey, 393 F. Supp. 715
(E.D.N.Y. 1975)), was largely responsible for the success of that case. However, the
association is less powerful in other states and cannot be relied upon to shoulder the
burden of this tremendous litigation. In Montana, for example, there has been no in-
dication whatever of a private individual or organization interested in joining or taking
over the Mattson litigation. See note 93 supra.
122. In the legislative history to the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill
of Rights Act, Congress articulated its goal of enforcement of the "Bill of Rights". See
note 117 and accompanying text supra.
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C. Constitutional Implication
The more difficult question is whether Solomon satisfies the standards for
constitutional implication and beyond that, whether there does and should
exist a doctrine of pure constitutional implication of cause of action in favor
of the United States. The principles of statutory implication are adaptable
to constitutional implication, but the presence of a federal plaintiff raises im-
portant concerns about separation of powers, and the appearance of a state-
affiliated defendant interjects questions of federalism. Whether these con-
cerns alone will suffice to undermine a right of action is an issue courts have
rarely faced, because in almost every instance there has been some type of
congressional enactment used to bolster constitutional implication. The
courts which have purported to espouse direct constitutional implication must
have been somewhat influenced by the indication of the positive will of Con-
gress. The cases in which greatest exposure was given to the idea of an in-
herent constitutional authority for the United States to bring suit are Debs,
City of Jackson, and Brand Jewlers. The language they use to support their
theories is strikingly similar to the underlying rationale of parens patriae
actions, in which states have repeatedly been granted the right to sue to pro-
tect the welfare of their citizenry. 123  The only instances in which state
parens patriae actions have been denied occurred when the state attempted
to sue the federal government.' 24 This could not be countenanced because,
as the Supreme Court decreed, the United States was the ultimate parens
patriae in representing the rights of citizens in their relations with the federal
government. 125 The decision whether to allow a state versus federal suit was
based on policy concerns involving the proper allocation of authority within
the federal system.' 26
If these principles can be applied to a situation in which the Federal Gov-
ernment seeks to bring a parens patriae action against a state, the operative
question becomes whether the interest asserted is of a state or a national
nature.' 27 This test becomes circuitous because what one court defines as
a national interest another court will characterize as a state concern. The
problem has its roots in the fact that the parens patriae rationale does not
123. See, e.g., Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439 (1945); Pennsylvania v.
West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923).
124. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923); Pennsylvania v.
Kleppe, 533 F.2d 668 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 485 (1976).
125. Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 485-86 (1923).
126. Pennsylvania v. Kleppe, 533 F.2d at 676. For a discussion of the implications
of Kleppe, see 26 CATH. U. L REV. 168 (1976).
127. 533 F.2d at 676.
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consider separation of powers. If Congress had determined the matter to be
one of federal interest, only the Supreme Court could rule otherwise. Since
Congress has made no determination, the Executive is in no better position
than a district court to decide what is or is not a federal concern. This is
why there can be no "pure" constitutional implication in the parens patriae
area; there is no way to assuage the balance of powers and federalism
concerns.
On the other hand, these problems are less of an obstacle when a congres-
sionally enacted statute defines a significant federal interest, whether or not
it provides an explicit cause of action. The Supreme Court has recently
recognized this possibility. 128  From such a statute the will of Congress can
be implied to ascertain that the matter is one in which the federal interest
prevails.
The statutes on which the United States relied in Solomon define signif-
icant federal interests, both in the civil rights of the citizens and especially
in the rights of mentally retarded citizens. Solomon would, therefore, appear
to be a proper candidate for this quasi-constitutional implication under the
parens patriae theory.
IV. CONCLUSION
Despite the breadth of language used to explicate their rationales, Debs
and its successors do not grant unrestrained authority for the Executive to
bring suit to enforce any constitutional provision. The integrity of our con-
stitutional form of government, with its inherent concerns for a separation
of powers and a balance between federal and state jurisdiction, would be
undercut by such a rule.
There is, however, ample authority for a quasi-constitutional statutory im-
plication of Executive authority to sue which would not offend other constitu-
tional principles. This is the process which was followed but not defined in
most of the decisions upholding a right of action under Debs. It may be
characterized as a modified parens patriae doctrine under which the Execu-
tive, seeking to enforce the constitutionally and statutorily recognized welfare
of the public, is allowed to bring suit to vindicate a significant federal inter-
est as defined in a federal statute. The statute and the proposed action,
under such an approach, would be evaluated under the same principles of
128. See Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463, 472-75
(1976), in which the Court indicates that the United States could have brought an action
on behalf of an Indian tribe, based on its relationship with that tribe as defined in the
Hell Gate Treaty and subsequent legislation, although there was no specifically enacted
cause of action which included the Government. Id. at 474, n.13.
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statutory implication which apply to private plaintiffs, as enunciated by the
Supreme Court in Cort v. Ash, and the action would be sustained or dismissed
based on that analysis.
The theory described does not require a straining of constitutional
precepts; it merely advocates a logical extension of federal law to situations
not specifically considered at the time of the legislature's action in order to
effectuate the purposes of those laws. In situations such as the one at Rose-
wood State Hospital, where a significant federal interest in the human rights
of a large number of citizens is at stake, the courts should utilize the valid
principles of implication to reach a just and constitutional result.
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